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ABSTRACT
Clustering software into peer groups based on its apparent func-
tionality allows for simple, intuitive categorization of software that
can, in particular, help identify which software uses comparatively
more privilege than is necessary to implement its functionality. Such
relative comparison can improve the security of a software ecosys-
tem in a number of ways. For example, it can allow market opera-
tors to incentivize software developers to adhere to the principle of
least privilege, e.g., by encouraging users to use alternative, less-
privileged applications for any desired functionality. This paper in-
troduces software peer group analysis, a novel technique to identify
least privilege violation and rank software based on the severity of
the violation. We show that peer group analysis is an effective tool
for detecting and estimating the severity of least privilege violation.
It provides intuitive, meaningful results, even across different defi-
nitions of peer groups and security-relevant privileges. Our evalua-
tion is based on empirically applying our analysis to over a million
software items, in two different online software markets, and on a
validation of our assumptions in a medium-scale user study.
1 Introduction
Modern software platforms like Chrome or Android often provide
mechanisms for restricting an application’s ability to perform security-
sensitive activity. This is usually done through a permission sys-
tem where the application must request and receive the necessary
privilege to perform any security-sensitive operation. An applica-
tion can receive its desired privileges by requesting the appropriate
permissions either statically, during installation, or dynamically, at
runtime, depending on the platform. The requested permissions are
granted to the application only if the system and the user approve
the request.
Such permission systems are designed to encourage software
developers to follow the principle of least privilege [29]—design
software to work with the minimal set of privileges needed for per-
forming its functionality. Having application developers follow this
principle helps reduce potential damage to users, by ensuring that
applications can only abuse the subset of privileges they have re-
ceived, even if they get compromised, or turn malicious. In par-
ticular, in order to gain the full privileges to a system, an attacker
would have to compromise multiple such applications. Thus, least-
privileged applications make the attacker’s job harder and provide
increased security to the user.
1.1 The challenge of achieving least privilege
In practice, creating least-privileged applications is a challenge:
finding minimal set of privileges required to implement a given
functionality, on a particular platform, can be an extremely diffi-
cult task. The most intuitive way of implementing some function-
ality may require significantly more privileges than the minimal
set required for alternate implementations. Moreover, the minimal
privileges needed to implement some functionality are dependent
on many factors, including the platform API, programming lan-
guage, libraries, and the interactive user interface exposed for the
functionality.
Consider the case of a Chrome extension that translates the con-
tents of a user-selected webpage from one language to another. One
way of implementing such a functionality is to monitor all the web-
pages visited by the user and inject software scripts that run in the
context of those webpages. This injected software can display a
user interface element (e.g., a translate button) on each webpage to
allow the user to trigger the translation of that webpage. Once the
user clicks the button, the webpage is translated and the Document
Object Model (DOM) of the webpage is updated with translated
contents and are shown to the user. This implementation will re-
quire privileges to all the user’s data on all webpages that the user
visits, because the injected script has full access to those pages.
At first glance, it might seem that no translation functionality
could be implemented without script injection, and the full privi-
lege it implies. This, indeed, is a popular means of implementing
such functionality. However, on closer scrutiny, one can find imple-
mentations that require far less privilege. For example, the Chrome
platform allows extensions to display a context menu on any web-
page visited by the user, such that the menu is only displayed after
some user interaction (e.g., a mouse click). Such context menus,
and the corresponding scripts, cannot access any contents of an
underlying webpage, unless that content has been highlighted by
the user before the menu was displayed; such highlighted content
can be accessed from the menu’s event-handler code. Therefore, a
translation extension could operate via a menu, translate text that
is highlighted by the user, and display the translation in an overlay
window. Such an implementation might serve many users’ pur-
poses equally well, but requires far less privilege than the previous
approach.
As shown by this webpage translation example, implementing
functionality with least privilege often requires significant effort
from software developers, a deep understanding of the platform,
and potentially a rethinking of user interactions. Unfortunately, de-
velopers on existing platforms have few incentives to reduce the
privileges that they request, since only the user stands in the way of
their software receiving any privilege they desire. As studies have
shown, most users will nearly always grant a privilege requested by
software developer [13,14], which is not surprising, given the intri-
cacies involved in such decisions. The result can be a trend where
developers that flout the principle of least privilege, reap signifi-
cant benefits from the increased privileges of their software. This
trend can quickly become a self-reenforcing cycle that renders a
platform’s permission system irrelevant, as all software ascends to
having full privilege. Such a trend can be depressingly hard to com-
bat, since it is difficult to reward developers that strive to use least
privilege: even for the most technically sophisticated and security-
conscious user, it is extremely hard to evaluate how well a software
application has minimized its use of privileges, for its functionality.
ar
X
iv
:1
51
0.
07
30
8v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  2
5 O
ct 
20
15
Figure 1: The description and related items for the Evernote soft-
ware in the Chrome Web Store.
1.2 Market-based approach to seeking least
privilege
Unlike the developers and the users of the applications, the software
markets hosting such applications have both the incentive and the
means for automatically identifying the least-privilege violators.
Online software markets have become a primary means by which
end-user applications and other software are discovered, installed,
updated, and managed. Such markets not only contain a great va-
riety of software items (often in the millions), but also maintain a
large amount of metadata about these items like descriptions and
categorizations of applications, list of similar applications, etc. For
example, Figure 1 shows some of the metadata about Evernote Web
Clipper software that appears in the Chrome Web Store.
In this paper, we demonstrate how software market owners can
leverage market metadata to cluster hosted software into peer groups
based on functionality, analyze their privileges relative to the cor-
responding peer groups, and thus identify over-privileged software
in an automated fashion. A peer group consists of software that
(for the most part) provide similar features and functionality, and
for which the user can expect similar behavior. For example, dif-
ferent text-editing applications are likely to belong in the same
peer group, whereas mobile-phone software that provides flashlight
functionality belongs in another peer group.
Once peer groups have been defined, the common patterns of
privileges can be identified for each peer group, and software ranked
in terms of how unexpected its privileges are compared to its peer
group. Thus, the apples can be compared against the typical apple,
and the oranges against the average orange. Any outlier software
who are significantly over-privileged can be isolated, and treated
specially. As we show in this paper, such a ranking is helpful for
multiple purposes like informing the application developers about
the unexpected privileges, helping users to pick lower-privileged
software with the desired features, etc.
Software peer groups offer the most meaningful points of com-
parison for software whose functionality is defined by a limited,
well-defined set of related features. Fortunately, most software in
online software markets satisfies this property. In fact, for some
markets, like the Chrome Web Store, the market operators explic-
itly prohibit software that bundles unrelated features, as part of their
fair use policy [16].
We summarize our main contributions below.
• We introduce the notion of peer group analysis in the context
of detecting over-privileged applications. We evaluate our
technique on two large datasets: one with 44, 000 Chrome
extensions from the Chrome Web Store and another with
more than one million Android applications from the Google
Play Store. We find the analysis to be effective in identifying
software violating the least privilege principle and identify-
ing the unexpected privileges.
We find that peer group analysis is a robust and generic tech-
nique: irrespective of which piece(s) of market metadata we
used to construct them, our peer groups permitted effective
estimates of spurious privileges, as long as they correctly as-
sociated software with similar functionality.
• We demonstrate that the results of peer group analysis can
be used for the following purposes: a) motivate the software
developers to lower privileges of their applications by iden-
tifying over-privileged applications and their spurious privi-
leges; and b) provide users with lower-privileged alternatives
for a desired feature by ranking all applications in the cor-
responding peer group according to their usage of spurious
privileges.
• We show that the idea of forming peer groups based on func-
tionality is in sync with user expectations of software secu-
rity privileges. Our user study confirm that users expect ap-
plications to have different privileges based on their function-
ality. We also confirm by analyzing some of the complaints
filed by users of software in the Google Play Store that, in
isolation, each user often has difficulty in correctly identify-
ing the spurious privileges of different applications.
Our techniques have already been used in both Chrome Web
Store and Google Play Store to rank, identify, and triage software
with spurious privileges.
2 Threat Model
For this work, we assume that the application developers may be
lazy or callous and violate the least privilege principle by develop-
ing over-privileged applications. However, we do not deal with ac-
tively malicious programmers who willingly steal user data or per-
form other abusive activities. Our goal is to create a safer ecosys-
tem with increased incentives for non-malicious developers to cre-
ate least-privileged applications.
3 Detecting Over-Privileged Software with
Peer Group Analysis
Peer group analysis is a common technique in business economics
to compare a corporation’s financial performance (e.g., price-to-
earnings ratio [24]) against its peers with similar features like ge-
ographical location and industrial sector [34]. In the context of
anomaly detection, peer group analysis has been used by Bolton
et al. [5] to detect credit card frauds. However, they tend to focus
more on the temporal aspect of the peers’ behavior. They formed
peer groups by selecting the credit cards showing similar behaviors
in the past and argued that their behavior should be similar in the
future as well.
By contrast, in this work, we apply peer group analysis in a way
that is closer to its original usage in business economics. We iden-
tify peer groups of applications based on their functionality and
compare their security privileges to get a better understanding of
how security-sensitive a particular application’s privileges are com-
pared to those of its peers. Identifying the privileges commonly
shared by the applications in the same peer group allows us to indi-
rectly estimate the set of minimal privileges required for providing
the common functionality of that peer group. Determining such
mappings, without using peer group analysis, is extremely compli-
cated and requires in-depth understanding of the platform API as
well as the low-level details about the implementation of the func-
tionality.
We define the following terms in the context of peer group anal-
ysis and use them for the rest of the paper.
• Peer group. Each peer group consists of a set of software
applications from which users expect to have similar func-
tionality.
• Unexpectedness. For a given application, unexpectedness is
the measure of how over-privileged it is relative to its peers;
this unexpectedness score is correlated with the severity of
the least privilege violation in an application.
• Unexpected privileges. A security privilege used by an ap-
plication is identified as unexpected if it is atypical relative
to the security privileges of the application’s peers.
• Over-privileged applications. An application is assumed to
be over-privileged if its unexpectedness value turns out to
be greater than a certain threshold. The actual value of the
threshold is a tunable parameter and may vary across differ-
ent peer group analysis implementations.
Peer group analysis consists of two separate steps: identifying
different peer groups based on functionality and finding over-privileged
applications by detecting outliers in each such peer group based on
their privileges. The list of over-privileged applications along with
their unexpectedness scores can be used in several ways to make
software platforms more secure, as described below.
• Providing incentives to developers for creating less-privileged
applications. Market owners can use peer group analysis to
identify the applications who use less privileges than their
peers. Such applications can be rewarded by ranking them
higher in the search results and thus increasing their visibil-
ity. Similarly, the developers who repeatedly create severely
over-privileged applications can be warned or suspended by
the market owner.
Also, as part of computing the unexpected privileges, peer
group analysis can estimate the minimal set of privileges
used by applications in a peer group for implementing the
common functionality. Sharing such information with a de-
veloper designing a new application that belongs to an ex-
isting peer group can be very useful as the list of minimal
privileges provide the developer with a baseline to aim for.
• Helping users avoid over-privileged software. As we show
in Section 4, security-conscious users try to detect spurious
privileges of an application by associating its privileges with
its functionality. Unfortunately, they often make mistakes
due to the complexity of the process. Unexpectedness esti-
mation using peer group analysis can automate this process
and make it more robust. Sharing the unexpectedness scores
with the users can help them find less privileged software for
their desired functionality.
4 Do Users Expect Security Privileges to be
Tied to Software Functionality?
In this section, we show that users expect software to use different
privileges based on their functionality. To that end, we first ana-
lyze the abuse reports filed by users about the Google Play Store
applications and show that users often complain about the security
privileges of a software that they cannot relate to the functionality
of the software. However, we also find that these complaints of-
ten make invalid assumptions about the mapping between security
privileges and software functionality, which are complicated and
platform-dependent. Next, we describe an Amazon Mechanical
Turk (MTurk) study with 300 participants whose results confirm
that users indeed have different privilege expectations from appli-
cations providing different functionality.
4.1 User reports of privilege abuse
We analyzed one month’s submitted abuse reports, from the end of
2013, where users of Google Play Store software complain about
abusive security permissions. The dataset contained abuse reports
for over 200 different Android applications, with between 1 − 40
abuse reports per application. We find that, in general, users com-
plained that applications require “too many permissions" or that
“permissions are far too invasive for what this application does.”
Many reports also explicitly stated several mismatches between the
expected functionality and the requested privilege. For instance,
one report said: “Please tell me WHY a banking app needs to take
pictures or videos.” Note that this user did not realize that this
banking application needed the picture of a check for automatic
check processing. Another report stated: “FLASHLIGHT app re-
quires *network* access? Come on!”. Similar to the previous case,
the user did not understand that this application, like many other
free ones, use network access for serving advertisements.
These abuse reports show that users often try to detect unex-
pected privileges, depending on software functionality, in line with
previous findings by Jin et al [20]. However, the reports also points
out that the users need significant assistance in order to correctly
perform such analysis, e.g., by receiving a better basis for compar-
ison from an automated system.
4.2 User study results
We conducted an MTurk survey with 300 participants to test if
user expectations of the privileges required by specific applica-
tions depend on the application functionality. We had the survey
reviewed by experts from our institution, and piloted with 20 peo-
ple on MTurk before launching it. Participants took on average 6
minutes to complete the survey, and were compensated with 0.91
US Dollar.
Previous studies showed that the MTurk population was more
diverse than that found on a typical college campus and that using
MTurk could result in high-quality data [6, 22]. However, as with
any online survey, participants on MTurk may cheat by answer-
ing all questions quickly without reading thoroughly to collect the
compensation. To prevent such spurious data affecting our results,
we restricted our survey only to the respondents who had a task ap-
proval rate of 95% or better and had completed at least 100 tasks
on MTurk. Furthermore, our survey had one trap question, which
had one single, obviously right answer. We ensured that all partici-
pants answered that question correctly. Finally, one member of the
research team reviewed all responses to the open-ended questions
to ensure that responses were on topic.
Participant demographics. Participants in our MTurk survey were
skewed slightly towards male and young: 68% male, 32% female;
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Figure 2: User expectations of different security privileges (making a phone call, read SMS messages, access the internet, read the contacts
on the phone, take pictures, read calendar entries, find out phone’s location, and use the microphone) required by applications with different
functionality (social networking, shopping, gaming, messaging).
32% were between the ages of 18-24, 41% were 25-34, 18% were
35-44, 5% were 45-54, 3% were 55-64, and 1% were 65 or over.
As to their education, just over a third of the participants had Bach-
elor’s degrees and another third had ‘some college’. The remaining
third was spread over a broad range: from ‘some high school’ (1%)
or a Doctoral degree (1%) to having a Master’s degree (8%) or a
regular high school diploma (9%). Two thirds of the participants
were employed full- or part-time or were self-employed (40% full-
time, 15% part-time, and 13% self-employed). 17% of the partici-
pants were students, some of whom were also employed, and 16%
were unemployed or looking for work. Participants represented a
broad range of occupations like driver, editor, photographer, library
assistant etc.
Results. Figure 2 summarizes the results of our user study. We
asked the participants to rate on a 5 point Likert scale (‘No’, ‘Prob-
ably not’, ‘Neutral’, ‘Probably yes’, and ‘Yes’), whether a social
networking app, a gaming app, a messaging app, and a shopping
app should be able to do a set of actions if installed on a cell phone.
We intentionally did not use the worlds “permissions” or “privi-
leges," since previous research has found that not all users know
what application permissions are [14].
Our results confirm that users expect applications with certain
functionality to access specific resources on the phone, but not oth-
ers. Participants almost unanimously expected a shopping and a
gaming application to not be able to read SMS messages or read
the contacts on the phone, while they thought a messaging appli-
cation should be able to have both of these privileges. However,
opinions about some privileges were mixed. For example, one par-
ticipant said a shopping application should be able to find out the
phone’s location: “Absolutely needs location to find more relevant
deals” while another disagreed: “The app should not be able to
access GPS. It should simply ask you the first time you install for
your zip code”. Note that both agree that shopping applications can
have access to some form of location information, but they differ in
how fine-grained they think it should be.
5 Estimating Unexpectedness using Peer Group
Analysis
In this section, first we show how software market peer groups
can be identified using several different sources of information that
most markets already maintain about their hosted software. Next,
we enumerate different ways for approximating the security privi-
leges of an application. Finally, we describe how one can compute
an application’s unexpectedness score using peer group analysis.
Figure 4: Distribution of the number of related extensions extracted
for each extension hosted in Chrome Web Store.
5.1 Identifying peer groups
As peer groups are based on application functionality, in order to
identify the peer groups, we must be able to the applications with
similar functionality. Fortunately, most existing software markets
maintain different sources of information about an application’s
functionality: classification into pre-defined static categories, list
of other related applications, textual descriptions, screenshots etc.
The markets usually maintain such information to help users in
finding out alternative applications providing similar functionality.
We can simply leverage these existing sources of information to
classify applications into different peer groups as described below.
Classification provided by the developers. Most markets including
the Chrome Web Store and Google Play Store require the develop-
ers to classify their applications in one out of a fixed set of pre-
defined categories while registering them with the markets. These
categories are broad and each of them cover a large set of func-
tionality. For example, Chrome Web Store supports different cat-
egories for applications like shopping, sports, news, blogging etc.
We can create peer groups of applications using categories by sim-
ply putting all applications belonging to each category in one peer
group.
Classification based on application recommendations. Soft-
ware markets usually maintain recommendation systems to help
the users in finding new applications. Most modern recommen-
dation systems output a list of related-items for the item an user
is interested in. These related-items are usually computed based
on collaborative filtering i.e. by extracting patterns from different
users’ behavior. For example, the Chrome Web Store displays a list
of related applications when a user looks at the details of any par-
ticular application. Figure 3 shows the list of related applications
for the Google Translate extension on the Chrome Web Store. One
can clearly see that the related applications provide similar func-
tionality i.e. translate text from one language to another.
One simple way to create the peer group from the related appli-
cation list is to put all related applications in one group. Figure 4
shows that this technique is very effective in creating small tightly-
knit peer groups.
Classification using other metadata. Most software markets con-
tain a large amount of unstructured metadata about each applica-
tion like its textual description or user comments/reviews. These
sources often contain a large amount of information about applica-
tion functionality. Different automated classifiers can be designed
to assign the applications to different peer groups based on these
sources. For the rest of this subsection, we focus on identifying
Figure 5: Word cloud showing top 20 words of a topic detected by
LDA that consists mostly of ‘movies’ and ‘videos’. The font sizes
of the words are proportional to their probability of selection under
the topic.
peer groups based on the textual descriptions of applications even
though some of our techniques may also work on other sources like
user reviews or comments.
In both the markets that we studied, all applications come with
short textual descriptions about their functionality. These textual
descriptions are designed to make human users better understand
application features.
We explore two different techniques for designing classifiers that
can use these textual descriptions to identify applications with sim-
ilar functionality: one uses supervised learning algorithms to clas-
sify the applications into pre-defined categories and the other lever-
ages unsupervised learning algorithms to cluster similar applica-
tions together. We describe both of these methods in detail below.
Supervised classification. Supervised classifiers can assign ap-
plications automatically to a set of pre-defined categories using
features extracted from the textual descriptions of the applications.
However, such classifiers require a set of correctly labeled applica-
tions to train on, before they can be used for classification. One way
of creating such training data can be to simply use a small subset
of the developer-provided categorizations from the market. Obvi-
ously, to ensure the quality of the training data, the categorizations
should be manually checked.
As a proof of concept, we built a Naive Bayes text classifier and
used it to classify the extensions hosted in the Chrome Web Store.
We gathered 15000 extensions from the Chrome Web Store along
with their textual descriptions and their developer-provided catego-
rization in one of 19 different categories. We further divided the
dataset into two sets: a training set with 9000 extensions and a
test set with 6000 extensions. Our Naive Bayes classifier is trained
on the descriptions and categories of the extensions in the train-
ing set. Once trained, we use the classifier on the descriptions in
the test set and evaluate the accuracy of the classifier by compar-
ing the assigned categories with the developer-provided ones. In
our tests, we found that our Naive Bayes classifier was able to cor-
rectly categorize almost 60% of the extensions. While manually
inspecting some of the applications that were assigned to differ-
ent categories than their developer-provided ones, we found that
our classifier actually categorized several extensions correctly that
were mis-categorized by the developers. For example, the Google
voice extension that can be used to make calls or send SMS was
mis-categorized by the developer under the ‘blogging’ category but
the our classifier correctly assigned it to the ‘phone-and-sms’ cate-
gory.
Unsupervised classification. Unlike supervised techniques, the
unsupervised ones do not need any training data and thus they can
be used to detect applications with similar functionality without any
manual effort.
Figure 3: The related software items for the Google Translate extension in the Chrome Web Store.
We built a prototype implementation using Latent Dirichlet Al-
location (LDA) [4] to both automatically find topics out of the tex-
tual descriptions and to estimate the likelihood of an application
belonging to a topic. We classify the applications into different
peer groups by creating one peer group for each such topic and
including all applications whose probability of belonging to that
topic is higher than a threshold. In order to evaluate our prototype,
we collected the English textual descriptions of 44, 000 extensions
from Chrome Web Store. We used standard natural language pre-
processing techniques like removing the stop words and lemma-
tizing to clean up the descriptions. We also removed very short
words with less than 3 characters and words that do not appear in a
standard English dictionary. Our implementation used the gensim
library [27] for topic modeling to create a LDA model using the
cleaned descriptions.
Note that for creating meaningful peer groups, the topics found
by LDA must map to real application functionality. In our exper-
iments, we found that while some topics detected by LDA map to
meaningful functionality, several topics do not relate to any par-
ticular functionality. For example, Figure 5 show the word cloud
representations of the topics found by LDA that map to ‘movies’
category. However, as mentioned earlier, we also found that several
topics generated by LDA did not relate to any particular function-
ality. For example, one such topic contained the following words
in decreasing order of probability of their selection: ‘page’, ‘click’,
‘search’, ‘link’, ‘image’, ‘test’, ‘button’, ‘icon’, ‘tab’, and ‘site’.
Furthermore, when we looked at some of the developer-assigned
categories of the extensions belonging to this topic, we found that
46%, 21%, 19%, 7%, and 7% of them are classified by the devel-
opers under ‘productivity’, ‘communication’, ‘web development’,
‘fun’ and ‘search-tools’ categories respectively. As the efficacy of
peer group analysis depend on the ability to create peer groups of
applications based on functionality, we chose not to use the LDA-
based classifiers further in our experiments for the rest of the paper.
5.2 Estimating security privileges
Before we can compare an application against its peers, we must be
able to enumerate all security-relevant behaviors of the application.
A simple and effective way of circumscribing such behaviors is
to create a list of the security privileges used by the application.
Most modern software platforms including Chrome and Android
use pre-defined permissions to restrict an application’s privileges
to access arbitrary resources. Therefore, in such systems, the set
of permissions used by an application describes the privileges it
used. However, finding the exact set of permissions that are actually
used by an application is a hard problem. Below, we describe two
different ways to approximate permissions used by applications.
Requested Permissions. In most static permission-based systems
like Chrome or Android, application developers must declare all the
permissions that their applications need to operate correctly. How-
ever, in most cases, the application writers tend to over-estimate the
permissions used by their applications [2, 10].
Estimated Permissions. Permissions used by an application can
be estimated by first collecting all API calls that an application
makes, then using a platform-specific mapping between the API
calls and the permissions to enumerate the corresponding permis-
sions [2,10]. The API calls made by an application can either be es-
timated statically or dynamically. The static techniques often over-
estimate the API calls due to the presence of unused functions while
the dynamic ones underestimate the API calls because of the lack
of full coverage.
5.3 Estimating unexpectedness
For computing unexpectedness of an application’s privileges rela-
tive to its peers, one can use standard machine learning techniques
like One-Class Support Vector Machines (OC-SVM) [31]. How-
ever, one of the major drawbacks of these techniques is that the
rationale behind their decisions is often hard to explain to a human.
In order to be useful for our purposes, the reason why an appli-
cation is considered over-privileged must be easily explainable to
both the developers and users. To achieve this goal, we chose to use
a simple intuitive technique, as shown in Algorithm 1, for comput-
ing unexpectedness scores. Our technique is easy to understand and
reason about. This is a necessary condition in our setting as the the
unexpectedness scores are designed to be interpreted by the devel-
opers and users. Moreover, our algorithm can easily be modified to
find out the baseline privileges for each peer group. This informa-
tion can be very useful to a developer designing a new application
that belongs to an existing peer group.
The basic intuition behind Algorithm 1 is to first isolate the un-
common privileges for each peer group and then compute each ap-
plication’s unexpectedness score based on how many such uncom-
mon privileges it uses. Wp in Algorithm 1 indicates the amount of
weight we assign to each such uncommon privilege.
6 Experimental Setup
We evaluate our techniques on two different software markets: the
Chrome Web Store and the Google Play Store. We describe our
experimental setup for each of these markets in detail below.
Extensions from Chrome Web Store. We collected a set of 44, 000
Chrome extensions covering all the extensions that were published
Algorithm 1 Computing the unexpectedness value of an applica-
tion a with respect to peer group g.
for all application a in market do
unexpectednessa ← 0
Pa ← privileges used by a
ga ← peer group of a
for all p ∈ Pa do
Ng ← number of applications in ga
Ngp ← number of applications in ga using p
Xgp ← Ngp/Ng
ifXgp < relative_frequency_threshold then
unexpectednessa ← unexpectednessa +Wp
end if
end for
end for
in the Chrome Web Store during early 2014. For each extension,
we extracted its developer-provided category, the list of related ex-
tensions, and the list of requested permissions from the Chrome
Web Store. To extract the set of requested permissions, we first
parse declared permissions from the extension manifests, removed
any invalid permissions that the developers may have added by mis-
take. As specific host permissions are usually rarely repeated across
applications, we also filtered out such permissions except all_urls.
Android applications from Google Play Store. We gathered
more than a million Android applications covering all applications
present in the Google Play Store during a specific day in the last
six months. We extracted the developer-provided category, the list
of requested permissions from the manifest, and the application bi-
nary for each application. The application binaries were disassem-
bled using the smali disassembler and analyzed to enumerate all
API calls as well as the permissions required to successfully make
those API calls. To estimate the permissions from API calls, we
used the mapping of API calls to permissions provided by Au et
al. [2]. For the rest of the paper, we refer to these sets of per-
missions as “estimated permissions” of an application. Note that
neither the estimated permissions nor the requested permissions
exactly represent the permissions used by an application as an ap-
plication binary often contains code that do not get executed and
developers often request permissions that are never used by their
applications. Therefore, to get a better approximation of the actual
used permissions, we also computed the intersection of requested
and estimated permissions for each application.
Implementation. We implemented our techniques using two Map-
Reduce tasks: one for computing relative frequency of privileges
for each peer group and the other for computing unexpectedness
values for each application and detecting over-privileged applica-
tions. We implemented Algorithm 1 as part of the second MapRe-
duce task. For all our tests, we set Wp to 1 for the privileges that
we deemed security sensitive and to 0 for the rest.
7 Evaluation
In this section, we first use our Chrome extension and Android ap-
plication datasets to evaluate how the actual methods for peer group
estimation and the values of different settings for peer group anal-
ysis affect the estimated unexpectedness scores. Next, we explore
how useful the unexpectedness scores are for different purposes
(e.g., helping developers adhere to the principle of least privilege,
helping users avoid over-privileged applications) using the same
datasets.
Figure 6: Variability of the percentage of applications
with at least one unexpected privileges, for different
relative_frequency_threshold choices.
7.1 Effects of peer group parameters
To estimate the effects of different settings of peer group analysis
on its effectiveness, for each setting, we measure how many ap-
plications in our datasets have no unexpected security privileges
relative to their respective peer groups. As these applications are
deemed to be ‘normal’ in their peer groups, we expect them to be
the majority in our datasets. A low number of such applications will
indicate that the peer groups are not well formed i.e. they contain
applications with completely different functionality.
Picking relative_frequency_threshold. One of the main con-
figuration parameters for our unexpectedness estimation algorithm
(Algorithm 1 in Section 5.3) is relative_frequency_threshold.
This parameter decides the minimum proportion of applications in
a peer group that has to use a privilege in order to label that privi-
lege as “expected” for that peer group. Figure 6 shows the variation
of the percentage of applications that have at least one unexpected
privilege with different values of the relative_frequency_threshold.
For all of our tests, we set the relative frequency threshold to 0.10
for Chrome extensions and 0.05 for Android applications.
Figure 7: Variability of the percentage of outlying extensions with
unexpected privileges, for different peer group sizes.
Peer group sizes. Figure 7 shows how the percentage of Chrome
Figure 8: Variability of the percentage of applications with no un-
expected privileges, for different privilege types.
extensions with no unexpected privileges varies with different peer
group sizes. For peer groups that contain only 1 − 4 peers, there
are only around 60% of such extensions even for a low relative
frequency threshold of 0.10. This indicates that such small peer
groups may not be very effective in estimating unexpectedness as
they might mark a large number of applications as unexpected.
However, with peer groups of size 10 − 14, the percentage of ex-
tensions with no unexpected privileges rises to around 80% for the
same relative frequency threshold. Nonetheless, for peer groups of
sizes larger than 14, their percentage falls to around 60− 70%.
Different types of privilege estimation. Figure 8 shows how the
percentage of less-privileged applications vary with different types
privilege estimation using the Android dataset. We used four dif-
ferent ways for privilege estimation: requested privileges by the de-
velopers, method calls statically extracted from application binary,
statically estimated permissions from application binary, and inter-
section of statically estimated permissions and developer-requested
permissions. We found that the statically estimated permissions
and the intersection of the requested and estimated permissions
yield the best results.
7.2 Effectiveness of peer group analysis
Provide incentives to developers for creating less-privileged ap-
plications. Creating applications with lower privileges require
significant amount of work and the existing system provides the
developers no incentives to do it. Therefore, developers often tend
to create over-privileged applications. However, we found that
different developers tend to create differently over-privileged ap-
plications even when the applications have similar functionality.
This is primarily caused by the differences in how the develop-
ers implement a particular functionality. We found wide varia-
tions in the unexpectedness scores of the applications from the
same peer group. For example, Table 1 shows the unexpectedness
scores and privileges of applications from two different peer groups
in Chrome Web Store: one with five PDF readers and the other
with eight tab managers. As we can see, different applications in
the same peer group have widely different unexpectedness scores.
For example, ‘docs-pdfpowerpoint-viewer’ has a score of 0 while
‘pdf-viewer’ has a score of 3. Also, it can be seen form Table 1
that over-privileged applications in the same peer group like ‘pdf-
viewer’ and ‘Chrome-office-viewer-beta’ are over-privileged with
very different privileges (pdf-viewer uses ‘WebNavigation’ , ‘we-
bRequest’, and ‘webRequestBlocking’ and Chrome-office-viewer-
beta uses ‘clipboardWrite’, ‘fileBrowserHandler’, ‘fileSystem’).
Such wide variation in the unexpectedness scores inside the same
peer group also indicate that there is a large difference among the
applications in terms of their adherence to the least privilege prin-
ciple even when they are providing the same functionality. The
unexpectedness score provides a metric to market owners for sepa-
rating less-privileged applications from over-privileged ones. Mar-
ket owners can leverage such information in different ways to en-
courage developers in creating less-privileged applications as men-
tioned below.
Rewarding applications with less privileges. Applications with
low unexpectedness scores indicate that their developers have put
more effort in following the principle of least privilege than other
developers. To encourage such behavior, market owners can pro-
vide positive reinforcements like ranking such applications higher
in the search results than their peers or providing the developers
of such applications with special badges/points. Such positive re-
inforcements may encourage other developers to do a better job at
creating less-privileged applications.
Penalizing callous developers. An over-privileged application of-
ten indicates that its developer did not invest the required effort to
lower its privileges. Among the over-privileged applications de-
tected by peer group analysis, we found numerous such cases. For
example, we found that the ‘pdf-viewer’ uses the webRequest priv-
ilege to serve advertisements even when there are less-privileged
ways of achieving the same goal. As another example, consider the
case of a Facebook game named ‘facebook mafia wars’ that uses
the privilege for installing or removing other extensions to scan and
automatically remove any conflicting extensions. A less-privileged
way of performing the same task would have been to simply ask the
user to disable the conflicting extension. We also found that sev-
eral developers repeatedly violate least-privilege in most of their
applications irrespective of the functionality. Such developers can
be identified easily with the unexpectedness scores of their appli-
cations and be warned or banned by market owners.
Sharing information about peer groups with developers. In or-
der to help developers create less-privileged applications, market
owners can inform developers about the functionality and privi-
leges used by the applications with low unexpectedness scores from
different peer groups . Such information can be useful to the de-
velopers in several ways. First, a developer creating a new appli-
cation can check the minimal of privileges used by applications
in the corresponding peer group and treat these privileges as the
baseline for the new application. Next, existing application devel-
opers may be more motivated to use less privileges if they know
that a given functionality can be implemented using less privileges
than they are using in their application. Consider three different
Facebook notification extensions from Chrome Web Store: Face-
book Chat Notification, Facebook notification icon, and Facebook
Notifier; all of them provide similar functionality of notifying the
user about some Facebook event (e.g., new chat messages, wall
posts). However, the first one only requires the privilege to access
the browser history, the second one requires access to the user’s
data from facebook.com, and the last one requires access to
the user’s data from all domains. If the developers of the second
and third extensions know about the existence of the first one, they
might be willing to emulate its implementation by redesigning their
extensions to remain competitive.
Helping users to avoid over-privileged applications. Over-privileged
applications can cause significantly more damage to the user when
compromised than their less-privileged counterparts. Moreover,
Table 1: Variation of unexpectedness across different peer groups.
Peer group App name Score Unexpected privileges
pdf reader
docs-pdfpowerpoint-viewer 0 -
pdfescape-free-pdf-editor 0 -
beeline-reader 1 webNavigation
pdf-viewer 3 WebNavigation , webRequest, webRequestBlocking
Chrome-office-viewer-beta 3 clipboardWrite, fileBrowserHandler, fileSystem
tab manager
Tab Manager 0 -
Project Tab Manager 1 bookmarks
Awesome Tab Manager 2 bookmarks, unlimitedStorage
TooManyTabs for Chrome 2 bookmarks, unlimitedStorage
Tabs Outliner 3 idle, notifications, storage
Tabman Tabs Manager 3 history, topsites, webNavigation
Fruumo Tab Manager 3 bookmarks, history, unlimitedStorage
Session box - Tabs manager 4 clipboardWrite, cookies, management, unlimitedStorage
Figure 9: Distribution of the percentages of suspended extensions
with unexpectedness score in Chrome Web Store.
we find that over-privileged applications are more likely to be sus-
pended by market owners due to policy violation, spamming, and
other suspicious activities. Therefore, it is in the best interests of
the users to try to avoid the over-privileged applications.
To evaluate the hypothesis that the over-privileged applications
get suspended more often than th less privileged ones, we created
a new dataset by picking 3828 randomly chosen extensions from
our existing Chrome Web Store dataset and augmenting them with
3828 suspended extensions. These extensions have been suspended
by the market owner due to a variety of reasons including malicious
activity, spamming, violating market policies etc. We compute the
unexpectedness values for all extensions in the dataset including
both the suspended and live extensions. For each application with
a unexpectedness score greater than zero, we compute the percent-
age of suspended applications for different scores. Figures 9 and
11 show the results from the experiments using the category-based
peer groups and the peer groups based on related items respectively.
Both these figures clearly demonstrate that, irrespective of the tech-
nique used for creating peer groups, applications with high unex-
pectedness scores are very likely to be suspended.
Unexpectedness score provides the users with a simple way to
compare an application’s privileges with respect to its peers (i.e.,
other applications providing similar functionality). A security-conscious
user should pick applications with low unexpecteness scores from
the peer group corresponding to the desired functionality. For ex-
ample, if the user is looking for a PDF reader, she should probably
pick the pdf-viewer application from the PDF reader peer group
shown in Table 1 (assuming, of course, it provides all the desired
features).
The market owners can facilitate this process by designing user
interfaces that help users to easily find less privileged applications
for a given functionality. For example, the search results returned
to the user for a particular query to the application store can contain
the unexpectedness scores of all applications present in the search
results. The users should be able to sort the applications based on
their unexpectedness score. Also, instead of showing the numeric
unexpectedness scores to the user, the scores can be color coded
according to their score (e.g., high, medium, and low scores can be
represented by red, medium scores by red, yellow, green respec-
tively as shown in Figure 10).
Figure 11: Bubble plot showing variation of the percentage of
suspended extensions in Chrome Web Store with unexpectedness
score and number of related items i.e. peer group size. The sizes of
the triangles are proportional to the percentage of suspended exten-
sions with a particular unexpectedness value and a particular peer
group size.
8 Related Work
Detecting malicious and risky software on Android. Several prior
works on the Android platform have focused on detecting mali-
cious software using a variety of supervised or unsupervised ma-
chine learning algorithms [1, 12, 26, 32, 35–37].
One popular approach towards detecting potentially malicious
Android applications is to identify risky combinations of Android
permissions requested by an application and warn the users about
them. A risk score is defined such that malicious applications tend
to have higher risk scores than non-malicious ones. Such an ap-
Figure 10: A sample interface for displaying color-coded unexpectedness scores of each application present in the search results.
proach has been argued to be more effective than the exiting sys-
tem that shows warnings containing most of the requested permis-
sions [9, 18, 30]. However, identifying such combinations with-
out considering application functionality often results in spurious
warnings. To avoid such issues, machine learning algorithms have
been used to analyze permission requests from different types of
applications [3, 23]. Peng et al. [23] introduced the idea of risk as-
sessment of an Android application relative to other applications
and evaluated different machine learning techniques for computing
an application’s risk score. They use the computed risk scores for
detecting malware and protecting users from risky applications.
However, all of these approaches assume that the application de-
velopers are malicious. By contrast, our approach deals with care-
less and lazy developers who are not actively malicious. Our goal
is to make the developers, market owners, and users to work to-
gether to make more applications least-privileged. In order to be
helpful to the developers, the results of our approach must not only
be explainable easily to the developers but also provide useful in-
formation for minimizing developer efforts spent in creating least-
privileged applications (e.g., which privileges they should try to
remove from an application). As all the prior approaches simply
focus on detecting malicious or risky software and helping users to
avoid them, their techniques not suitable for our purposes.
Detecting unused privileges. At a higher level, our goal to detect
over-privileged applications is similar to that of Felt et al. [11] and
Au et al. [2]. However they used static analysis on the application
code to find privileges that are requested by the application but are
never used. By contrast, we focus on finding the privileges that are
used by the application but are not necessary for the least-privileged
implementation of the functionality.
Mapping application privileges to their textual descriptions. Pan-
dita et al. [21] and Qu et al. [25] used natural language processing
techniques to identify if an application’s description contain expla-
nations about why they need certain permissions. They argued that
sharing such information with the user can be very helpful in decid-
ing whether the user wants to install the applications or not. Their
approaches are complementary to ours and can be used to better ex-
plain to the users if an over-privileged application indeed needs an
unexpected privilege for implementing a feature unique to its peer
group.
Gorla et al. [17] built a tool called CHABADA that clusters An-
droid applications with similar textual descriptions together using
unsupervised machine learning techniques and identify outliers in
each of the cluster according to their API usage for identifying ma-
licious applications. While their goal is very different than ours, we
evaluated the possibility of using textual descriptions of applica-
tions as a source of information for creating peer groups and found
that such an approach, although somewhat promising, often put to-
gether applications with unrelated functionality in the same peer
group due to lack of details about an application’s functionality in
its textual descriptions provided by the developer. We describe our
findings in details in Section 5.1. Note that, for malware detection,
it is immaterial whether all benign applications in the same cluster
have similar functionality or not as long as all of their behaviors
differ from those of the malicious applications in the cluster. Such
an occurrence will ensure that the malicious applications will get
detected as outliers even if the benign applications have different
functionality. By contrast, for detecting least privilege violation, it
is absolutely necessary for the applications in the same peer group
to have similar functionality.
Detecting leakage of private information. Detecting Android and
iOS applications that leak user’s private information has been an-
other popular line of recent research [7,8,15,19,33]. However, the
detection of private data leakage is a related but different problem
than the detection of least privilege violation as most such leaking
applications are not violating the least privilege principle by ac-
cessing the private data i.e. they need access to the user’s private
data for providing their functionality.
User interfaces for Android permissions. Several studies have
found that users often have difficulty to comprehend the Android
permissions shown to them during the installation process and tend
to install applications irrespective of the permissions they request [10,
14]. Peer group analysis can help users in estimating the risks of
installing an application without understanding each of the per-
missions. Roesner et al. [28] have proposed using access control
gadgets provided by the operating system to allow users to grant
permissions for user-controlled resources like camera in a non-
intrusive and more intuitive manner. Such solutions can be used
together with unexpectedness scores calculated by peer group anal-
ysis for helping users to control the sensitive privileges used by
high-risk applications.
9 Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed and evaluated peer group analysis for ef-
fective and easy-to-understand detection of least privilege violation
in applications hosted in online software markets. We showed that
peer group analysis efficiently seeks out the over-privileged appli-
cations irrespective of the actual techniques used for forming the
peer groups. We also showed that identification of over-privileged
applications can help in improving the overall security of online
markets by encouraging the developers to write less-privileged ap-
plications and the users to avoid over-privileged ones. Our tech-
nique has already been partially deployed in Chrome Web Store
and Google Play Store. We hope that our work will encourage
other software market owners to also adopt peer group analysis.
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